By Sanjeev Sharma New Delhi, Nov 26th : .Some analysts have pointed out the existence of a specific, formally organized wing of ISI.
This is the ‘S’, or security wing.Jerusalem Post reported that this wing is directly responsible for the relationship to Lashkar-e-Taiba.
While LeT’s support and direction from ISI serving officers appears to have been confirmed in the Mumbai attacks of 26/11 is, there is still debate about whether ISI as a whole and, therefore, the Pakistani state, should be considered as supporting the group.Or whether the situation described by Zabiuddin ansari and George Headley show that ISI has an element that supports the terror group.
The report stated that there is no clear line of demarcation in this area.
When the US pressured Pakistan to investigate the matter and presented clear evidence of ISI operatives’ involvement, the Pakistani authorities stated that they were responsible.
The question of whether elements within or outside the ISI planned, assisted, and directed the Mumbai attacks remains unresolved.There are coherent points made by both sides of this debate.
“But, in any case, the picture is dire.If the former is true, then Pakistan is a state sponsor for terror.The report stated that if the latter, the Pakistani government is unable to account terrorist supporting activities that led to the deaths hundreds of people, carried out by serving officers in a top state institution.”
While LeT terrorists are directly responsible, there is solid evidence that this group did not act on its own.Instead, there was a close relationship between the group, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Organisation, or elements within this organisation, that was maintained prior to, during, and after the attacks.According to the report, Pakistan’s top intelligence agency is the ISI.
Steve Coll, a US journalist who specialised in Pakistan’s connections with terror groups, stated that the digital trail suggested the attackers from Mumbai were working for the ISI.Coll writes in his book Directorate S, that Pakistani officials were confronted by western officials with the relevant intercepts.The report stated that no systematic investigation was conducted.
It is clear that the Sunni Islamist LeT group was directly responsible for the Mumbai massacre.
Ajmal Kasab (captured gunman) admitted to being a member of this organization and detailed the process by which he and his fellow trainees had trained in Pakistan.They then set off for Karachi, the capital city of Pakistan’s Sindh Province.
LeT was confirmed by an Indian investigation as the source of the attacks.A number of LeT members were arrested on Pakistani soil after US and UN pressures.
The Pakistani government released the results of its investigation in 2009, which also confirmed the organization’s responsibility for the attacks.
Kasab, during his interrogation by Indian authorities and to FBI officers, confirmed that the Mumbai operation was conducted from Karachi using telephone and Internet communication.
David Coleman Headley (born Daood Gillani), a Pakistani citizen, was convicted by a US court in 2009 of surveillance for LeT before the attacks.He also provided extensive details about the group’s connections to the ISI.
Headley’s testimony suggests that serving ISI officers were involved in planning and funding the attacks.Headley identified one officer as “Major Iqbal”, who directed and funded the attacks and selected the targets.
Headley, according to his testimony, was dispatched by Iqbal on five reconnaissance missions to Mumbai in order to pick the targets that were later attacked by LeT in November 2008.
Headley claims that Iqbal chose Nariman Chabad House to attack because he claimed it was a Mossad front.
Headley also revealed that Iqbal attempted to launch an LeT attack against the offices of Jyllands-Posten newspaper.The Jyllands-Posten newspaper had published photos of Mohammed, the prophet, according to Headley.
David Headley provided details about Major Iqbal and a list of ISI officers who were involved in providing assistance to LeT.Headley claimed that Major Sameer Ali recruited him and Sajid Mir.
Headley’s claims about the ISI role during the attacks were later independently verified by Zabiuddin, an additional LeT operative.This person was Indian.He fled to Pakistan in 2006.He was extradited to India from Saudi Arabia in 2012.
Ansari stated that ISI provided the ammunition and weapons used in the attack.Ansari also confirmed that ISI officials were present at the LeT’s Karachi control area during the three-day attack.
Independently of David Headley’s account Ansari in India named Major Sameer Ali one of the officers present.According to the report, Ansari claimed Ali had given him the task of teaching simple Hindi phrases to Pakistani participants to the attacks.
This would have enabled them to make statements to Indian media in the aftermath of the siege.
Since 2008, the strategic relationship and partnership between India and Israel has increased exponentially.Despite the attacks on Mumbai, they continue to symbolize a commonality that remains at the heart of relations.”Both India, Israel, and Pakistan are non-Muslim nations.They are located on the eastern and western borders of the Islamic world’s heartland.Both must deal with the fallout of the ongoing, often disastrous encounter of large parts of that world with modernity and its subsequent challenges,” the report stated.
Partly or completely collapsed states whose territories and institutions become incubators for violent paramilitary organizations are one sign of a larger malaise.Mumbai, November 26, 2008 was a stark reminder of this reality.
There have been many other examples in the past, including recent ones.The increasing cooperation and solidarity between New Delhi, Jerusalem and other countries is not just a result of shared tragedy.
The report said that the Mumbai attacks and the circumstances that led to them will be a significant pillar of the wider relationship between Israel and India.
(Sanjeev Sharma can be reached at [email protected])
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